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The WTO Outlaws the Privileges of the Chinese Payment Services Giant
By Panagiotis Delimatsis
Introduction 
On August 31, 2012, in the absence of an
appeal, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Body adopted the Panel Report in China
—Electronic Payment Services.[1] In a
long-awaited decision, the Panel upheld
certain claims brought by the United
States under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (“GATS”)[2] against a
series of Chinese measures[3] imposed on suppliers of electronic payment services
(“EPS”).[4]
Benefiting from these measures, the Chinese EPS supplier, China UnionPay Co., Ltd
(“CUP”), has built a unique position in the Chinese EPS market, recently becoming the third
biggest EPS network globally, along with Visa and MasterCard, and supplanting American
Express.  With EPS transactions processed in China accounting for over $1 trillion,[5]
restoring fair competition in the Chinese payment market (and access to more than one
billion customers) was of particular importance for the major American EPS suppliers.
China, on the other hand, argued emphatically that its measures aim to establish the first
national inter-bank network for Renminbi (“RMB”) payment card transactions, relying on
uniform technical and commercial standards.
The United States may claim overall victory, as the Panel found that certain Chinese
measures violated its GATS obligations by restricting foreign EPS suppliers from providing
domestic RMB payment card transactions in China under conditions similar to CUP. The
Panel examined a series of Chinese measures requiring that: 1) payment cards issued in
China bear the CUP logo and issuers comply with technical standards imposed by CUP
(issuer requirements);[6] 2) all ATMs, merchant card processing equipment, and POS
terminals in China accept CUP cards (terminal equipment requirements); 3) acquiring
institutions post the CUP logo, become members of the CUP network, and accept all
payment cards with the CUP logo (acquirer requirements); and 4) CUP alone be
responsible for the clearing of certain RMB bank card transactions in China, Macao, and
Hong Kong (Hong Kong/Macao requirements). The Panel agreed with the United States
that these requirements accord more favorable treatment to CUP, violating China’s national
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treatment obligations.[7] The Panel found that China did not violate its market access
obligations,[8] as China undertook no market access commitments in its Schedule of
Specific Commitments (“Unbound” in GATS parlance), with one exception: Whereas China
had promised to provide full market access for EPS suppliers established in the Chinese
market, the Hong Kong/Macao requirements gave CUP monopoly power to conduct the
relevant transactions.[9]
Despite being one of the three main pillars of the WTO system, case law under GATS
remains scarce. This decision is therefore a welcome development in an underdeveloped
area of WTO case law, demonstrating the “bite” of GATS in opening services markets
globally. Crucially, this is also the first case to interpret provisions of the Financial Services
Annex (“FSA”).[10]
The Significance of GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments
Compared to the other WTO Agreements, GATS is a flexible contract whereby the main
liberalizing provisions—that is, the obligation to accord national treatment under GATS
Article XVII and the elimination of limitations on market access under GATS Article XVI—
apply only if a Member decides to open a given sector (e.g., financial services) or subsector
(e.g., payment services) by inscribing a commitment in its Schedule. As GATS defines
services through the identification of four modes of supply,[11] any limitations to the
commitments made are classified per mode of supply.[12] For instance, in Figure 1 below, a
Member would be obliged to fully liberalize the provision of legal services through
commercial presence of foreign suppliers (with “(3) None” indicating no limitations on
market access or national treatment in Mode 3), but it would retain the power to impose any
limitations on the cross-border supply of legal services (with “(1) Unbound” indicating no
liberalization on market access or national treatment in mode 1).
Figure 1: A simplified Schedule of Specific Commitments Under GATS














Thus, a Member’s Schedule determines the applicability of key GATS rules to that Member.
When inscribing a sector in its Schedule, a Member typically qualifies the access granted to
its domestic market or lists limitations on national treatment. Sometimes, as in this case,
interpretation of a Schedule becomes more difficult because of the unique terms used by a
Member. Pursuant to GATS Article XX:3, Schedules form an integral part of the GATS; the
customary rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties
therefore apply.
This decision underscores the significance of WTO Members carefully entering concessions
in their GATS Schedules.  In earlier GATS cases, WTO adjudicators rejected assertions by
China[13] and the United States[14] as to the true ambit of their Schedules. In this case,
however, China partly succeeded in establishing that the scope of its commitments was
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narrower than that suggested by the complainant.
Electronic Payment Services: The Panel’s Findings Relating to the Sector and the
Measures at Issue
As a threshold issue, the Panel determined that EPS for payment card transactions is an
integrated service, despite possible disaggregation.[15] The Panel went on to interpret the
scope of subsector 7.B(d) of China’s Schedule, headed “Banking and Other Financial
Services.” Following the analytical method used in US—Gambling, the Panel found that all
services that are essential to the processing and completion of transactions using payment
cards are “payment and money transmission services” within the meaning of China’s
Schedule,[16] including EPS.
The Panel agreed with the United States that the four sets of requirements described above
create a unique position for CUP in the Chinese EPS market. With respect to the Hong
Kong/Macao requirements, the Panel regarded CUP as the monopoly EPS supplier
regarding the relevant transactions.[17] However, the Panel dismissed the United States’
claim that the measures at issue, alone or in combination, establish CUP as the sole
supplier of EPS for all domestic transactions denominated and paid in RMB.[18] In addition,
the Panel found no broad prohibitions on the use of non-CUP cards for cross-region or
inter-bank transactions.[19] The Panel suggested that additional evidence—such as
economic analyses of profitability, price-cost margins, or demand elasticity—or evidence
relating to the conduct of CUP could have helped the United States to substantiate its
claims.
Market Access and National Treatment Under GATS
Limitations on Market Access to EPS in China
In this case, China clearly inscribed in its Schedule[20] the sub-sector “all payment and
money transmission services” as described in the GATS Financial Services Annex.[21] Less
clear was the scope of the market access commitment, as China argued that it had
inscribed no liberalizing commitments (“Unbound”) for EPS under the market access
column of its commitments for cross-border supply (mode 1) and commercial presence
(mode 3). After thorough analysis, the Panel concluded that China made no market access
commitments to liberalize cross-border supply of EPS, and thus it could restrict such
supply.
Nevertheless, the Panel found that China undertook market access commitments to
liberalize commercial presence (mode 3) for “foreign financial institutions.” In China’s view,
EPS suppliers fall outside this category of financial service suppliers. Absent any definition
of foreign financial institutions in China’s Schedule, GATS, or the FSA, the Panel examined
the ordinary meaning and context of the term to conclude that a foreign financial institution
is any foreign institution providing financial services classified under subsectors (a) to (f) of
China’s Schedule, including foreign EPS suppliers (i.e., non-bank financial institutions). In
the Panel’s view, the only reasonable meaning of China’s mode 3 commitment was that all
foreign financial institutions established in China, including foreign EPS suppliers, would
have unfettered access to engage in local currency business with all Chinese enterprises
and natural persons, subject to certain qualifications described in China’s Schedule.[22]
Having established the scope of the market access commitment, the Panel went on to
examine whether the four requirements fall within that scope. The Panel found that the first
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three requirements (the issuer, acquirer, and terminal requirements) do not limit the number
of service suppliers within the meaning of GATS Article XVI:2(a)d,[23] under modes 1 and 3.
However, the Panel found that the Hong Kong/Macao requirements constitute a limitation
on the number of EPS suppliers in violation of China’s mode 3 commitments, as they
establish a monopoly on the processing of RMB bank card transactions for the CUP,
contrary to GATS Art. XVI:2(a).[24]
Discriminatory Treatment to the Detriment of Foreign EPS Suppliers
Turning to the national treatment claim, the Panel first addressed the scope of China’s
commitments under mode 1 (cross-border supply). A systemic issue arises when a Member
inscribes (as did China in this case) no liberalizing commitments (“Unbound”) under the
market access column of its Schedule, but promises equal treatment (“None”) under the
national treatment column.[25] The Panel referred to GATS Article XX:2, which states: 
Measures inconsistent with both Articles XVI [market access]
and XVII [national treatment] shall be inscribed in the column
relating to Article XVI. In this case the inscription will be
considered to provide a condition or qualification to Article XVII
as well.
That Panel indicated that the GATS drafters did not intend to create a hierarchy between
GATS Articles XVI and XVII; rather, Article XX:2 is a scheduling guideline.[26] Nevertheless,
the Panel relied on this provision to find that an “Unbound” inscription under the market
access column can only be interpreted as limiting the scope of a promise of national
treatment. Thus, the Panel concluded that, despite inscribing “None” under the national
treatment column of its Schedule, China’s “Unbound” market access entry means China is
free to maintain the full range of limitations set out in Article XVI:2 for mode 1, even if they
are discriminatory. 
Accordingly, the Panel found that the Hong Kong/Macao requirements are consistent with
China’s national treatment commitments under mode 1 due to the “Unbound” inscription
under the market access column. However, the Panel suggested that the “Unbound”
inscription does not cover the other three requirements because the Panel had earlier found
that they do not come within the ambit of GATS Article XVI:2(a).  Therefore, the Panel
proceeded to examine whether these three requirements come under the national treatment
obligation. The Panel found that they are measures affecting the supply of services
pursuant to GATS Article XVII and provide less favorable treatment to like service suppliers
of foreign origin. Thus, the Panel agreed with the United States that the issuer, terminal,
and acquirer requirements, by establishing a privileged position for CUP within the Chinese
EPS market to the exclusion of foreign EPS suppliers, accord less favorable treatment to
foreign EPS suppliers in contravention of the Chinese national treatment commitments
under modes 1 and 3.
Conclusion
This case follows landmark decisions on the scope of GATS in US—Gambling and China—
Publications and Audiovisual Products and is expected to further open China’s financial
services market, benefiting American EPS suppliers in particular. Nevertheless, China will
likely have several months to implement the Panel ruling. The Panel decision offered
additional clarifications for the interpretation of Members’ Schedules of Specific
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Commitments under GATS. More importantly, as this case was not appealed, the Panel
Report represents the only WTO dispute settlement ruling on the overlap in a Schedule of
an  “Unbound” commitment (i.e., no liberalization) and a “None” commitment (i.e., full
liberalization). The case confirms that the flexibility attributed to Members in drafting GATS
Schedules can be a double-edged sword. At present, no clear solution exists to ensure
predictability and security in the interpretation of GATS Schedules.
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